

Making waves

IVSS CAMPAIGN MAR 2025





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1. PSC INSPECTIONS IN RELATION TO ENGINE ROOM EMERGENCY ESCAPE TRUNK

SOLAS Ch.-2/Reg. 13.4.2.1.1 requires that the emergency escape trunk extends to the "lower part of the space its serves". IMO issued MSC.1/Circ.1511/Rev.1 on Unified interpretations of SOLAS regulations II-2/9 and 13, dated 24 Jun 2024, providing more specific guidance on "safe position" in SOLAS regulation II-2/13.4.

China MSA has commenced a focused inspection campaign (FIC) from 15 January 2025 to 14 October 2025 on E/R Emergency Escape Trunk.

China MSA requires the following:

- The escape trunk is extended to the lowest platform/deck within the machinery space.
- Training and regular drills for evacuation from emergency escape trunk are to be conducted and recorded.
- An evacuation drill of an injured crew is to be completed between 3 to 5 minutes

The Master shall prepare ship specific evacuation procedure for injured crew from the lowest platform/deck to the escape trunk referring to **Contingency manual – section 19** and post it in vicinity of the escape trunk.

When preparing the evacuation procedure, the ship staff must consider the following:

- Whether the escape trunk is a vertical shaft from the bottom to top without any intermediate platform for lifting the injured crew
- Or if there is any intermediate platform, what is the safe procedure to lift the injured crew considering the length / breadth of the platform, how to move the injured crew within the platform and the number of blocks required

The Master shall also carry out an evacuation drill of an injured crew using a dummy within 5 minutes. Details of the drill to be recorded in Company form 3.2.3

2. ENCLOSED SPACE Concentrated Inspection Campaign

China MSA has launched a special campaign on the unauthorised entry into enclosed spaces onboard ships from 15 January 2025 to 14 October 2025.

Kindly go through attached circular and check list and ensure your vessel strictly adheres to enclosed space entry procedure

3. CYBER SECURITY

The Office will be sending video training links to each vessel along with the instructions by email. Once received all crew on board shall view the cybersecurity videos.

Typically, the video's will be made available on the Master's Laptop, CEO's PC and Admin 1 pc. We propose that the Engine Dept. must watch the video on the CEO's PC likewise the Deck Dept. will watch on Admin 1.

The Office will be providing details of the video to be viewed shortly. A poster will also be made available to be displayed.

4. KARCO TRAINING

The ship staff shall conduct the following training modules this month:

ENCLOSED SPACE ENTRY INTRODUCTION TO RIGHTSHIP INSPECTIONS SIMPLE MISTAKE, FATAL CONSEQUENCES

The duration of each title is only about 10-15 minutes.

Training must be carried out in two sessions (based on work/rest hours) to ensure all crew are able to attend. Each session must be opened and concluded by a Senior Officer.

After the training, the Senior Officer should have an interactive session with the crew, discuss questions and the crew can also share their experience (Reflective learning). Once the training is completed, each crew shall log on individually and an assessment must be completed, and the records must be exported to KARCO system.

The Master can contact IT department and support team (support@karcoservices.com) for any queries regarding KARCO.

Records of training to be maintained in form 3.2.3

5. REPORTING REQUIREMENTS IN CHINA

Kindly go through the attached Huatai circular, liaise with the agents and ensure the reporting requirements are complied with when calling China.

6. MEDITERRANEAN ECA

Please note that the Mediterranean Sea becomes a Sox ECA from 1 May 2025. Resolution MEPC.361(79), will prohibit ships operating within the Mediterranean Sea ECA from using fuel oils with a Sulphur content exceeding 0.1% m/m

Refer attached LR circular which clearly specifies the coordinates for change over. Please inform operators / charterers and plan for your bunkers accordingly well in time (if transiting this area).

7. OJT- GMDSS BATTERY ON OFF LOAD TEST

During a RightShip inspection it was observed that deck officers are not familiar with the GMDSS battery ON/OFF load test procedures which resulted in a RIGHTSHIP deficiency.

Please ensure that the tests are carried out in the proper manner and all officers are familiar with the testing procedures.

Kindly carry out OJT as per attached guidelines and record details of training in form 3.2.3.

8. RIGHTSHIP SECTION 12 – SECURITY

RIGHTSHIP has commenced inspection of dry vessels using their checklist (RISQ) which is uploaded on the landing page of SHEQ. The RIGHTSHIP inspection is similar to the OCIMF SIRE inspection on tankers.

There are 17 chapters in the RIGHTSHIP questionnaire.

The Company will send guidance for each section as part of the monthly campaign. For this month, the Master shall go through the attached "**SECURITY**" checklist with all deck officers and ensure that the vessel is in compliance with all the items.

Please revert to the Marine Superintendent with any queries or sections that your vessel does not fully comply with.

9. VOYAGE PLANNING AND EXECUTION WITHIN PLANNED NAVIGATION CORRIDORS

Please discuss the attached AMSA Marine Notice with all deck officers.

When it is necessary to immediately use the safety margin outside the planned navigation corridor, a visual check and assessment of the ECDIS should be made by the bridge team and a plan discussed/agreed by all to execute a deviation and return as soon as possible given the circumstances. The use of ECDIS look ahead functionalities in such cases becomes paramount.

AMSA recognizes the need for reasonable use of the safety margins outside the planned navigation corridor. However, unreasonable, and systematic use of the safety margins may indicate the need to reassess the voyage planning practices

A deficiency may be considered where an Australian PSC Officer finds:

- unreasonable and systemic use of the safety margins outside of the planned navigation corridor.
- no consideration given in voyage planning to the variation in XTD/XTL depending on confined or open waters.

10. FINGER INJURY WHEN USING THE MEAT GRINDER

On one of our managed vessels, the chief cook was using the meat grinder whilst grinding carrots and meat.

After he completed grinding, he observed that some pieces of carrots and meat were stuck inside the grinder, he tried pushing the obstructions inside using the feeding/pushing tool but this method could not remove the sticking meat.

He then used his index finger to push the meat down and during this process, the tip of his index finger got detached. (**The grinder was kept ON and running** when he inserted the finger)

The Company expects and requires that each crew devote their full attention towards personal safety. The basic principles of common sense, situational awareness, prudence, rational judgment, good practices of seamanship, prevailing circumstances and conditions are to remain the basis when performing any task onboard.

Please discuss the attached injury report with root cause and preventive measures and take measures to prevent recurrence.

11. FUMIGATION CASUALTY

We are sharing an incident where a cadet lost his life on board due to phosphine gas leak in cabin. This incident <u>did not</u> occur within our Owned / Managed fleet.

A handy-sized bulk carrier was loaded with wheat, and the cargo was fumigated after completion of loading.

When the fumigation procedure was undertaken, the hatch covers, ventilators and access hatches to all five cargo holds were sealed. The vessel then departed for a trans-oceanic voyage.

The crew had been briefed on the dangers of fumigation gas and the Master told the crew to stay alert for the smell of garlic or decaying fish as this scent had been added to the gas to allow easy detection.

During the first three days of the voyage, phosphine gas readings were taken at regular intervals at the upper deck accommodation and the forecastle deck. All readings were zero ppm.

On the fourth day, the gas test results showed that the accommodation on the upper deck contained 0.1 ppm of phosphine gas. (According to best practices, an eight-hour average respiratory exposure to phosphine gas should not exceed 0.3 ppm and a short-term exposure should not exceed 1ppm.)

On the same day, a crew member remarked that he had noticed a bad odour inside his cabin. A test in the cabin showed no phosphine gas but the crew member was relocated to another cabin.

The next day, a phosphine gas reading of 2 ppm was measured at the upper deck alleyway. The Master called muster stations and instructed all crew to evacuate their cabins at once. The engine cadet did not appear at muster, so two crew went to his cabin where he was found in a state of partial paralysis. The victim was taken outside for care. A phosphine gas reading of 9 ppm was measured in his cabin, which was located next to the cabin of the crew member who had been relocated the previous day.

Over the next hour, the victim's vital signs deteriorated. A request for radio medical advice was sent and cardio-pulmonary resuscitation was carried out, but the crew were

unable to revive the victim. His body was brought ashore at a port of refuge two days later.

The official investigation found, among other things, that a permanent access light for the aft access ladder of No. 5 cargo hold had been installed during construction. A conduit was used to run the electric cable between the accommodation and No. 5 cargo hold. The conduit ends were not sealed, contrary to best practices and classification rules. This defect allowed the phosphine gas to infiltrate the accommodation area and enter the crew cabins.

Please discuss this incident with ship's crew at next opportunity and inform them regarding the dangers caused due to leakage of the fumigant gas.

When fumigation of cargo is planned, extreme care should be taken to assess the integrity of ventilation trunks, shared bulkheads, duct keels and electrical conduits that might allow the passage of gas into accommodation or working areas.

The senior management personnel onboard shall check and ensure that conduits inside the holds (if any) are properly sealed and tested so that no gas enters the accommodation area. As a precautionary measure all electrical duct penetrations running through A-0 Bulkheads and deckheads are fully sealed. Typically when the crew run CCTV Cabling or fire door Magnetic holdback cabling the penetrations are disturbed but not re-sealed. Examples of this poor practice are shown below:





This affects the Fire integrity, gas tightness and sometimes the watertight integrity of the bulkhead.

The repair method shown is also unsuitable. Some of the sealing compound was found to be flammable with white polystyrene balls within the compound. The sealing cement should be certified with a fire rating equal to the bulkhead it is penetrating i.e. A-0 fire rated.



S.NO	QUESTION	GUIDANCE	Verified by Master
1	Are crew members responsible for enclosed space entry aware of the associated risks?	 Refer HSE Procedure Manual, 4.10. ENCLOSED SPACE ENTRY. Discuss the risks associated with entry into enclosed space with all crew (HSE Manual, 4.10 section 3 and section 4) Prepare risk assessment in CSM for enclosed space entry Pre-entry atmosphere test reading for entering the enclosed space shall be as follows: Oxygen – 20.9 % Hydrocarbon – 0% CO2 0% H2S 0% 	
2	Are the measures in place to permit to work for visitors and crew members for enclosed space entry?	 Enclosed space permit form 3.3.1 Name of person entering the space shall be entered in the permit to work form Crew and visitors are not allowed to enter any enclosed space unless the enclosed space permit form 3.3.1 is fully completed and approved by the Master / Chief engineer 	
3	Is there a list of enclosed space identified?	 A detailed ship specific list of enclosed spaces shall be prepared by the Master and posted on the Notice board. All crew shall be briefed on the list of enclosed spaces onboard. Refer HSE Manual, 4.10, section 3.4, 3.5 If in doubt, consider the space to contain hazards of an Enclosed Space and proceed as an Enclosed Space 	
4	Are the enclosed spaces marked and for authorized personnel only?	All enclosed spaces onboard shall be marked Enclosed Space No entry without permit	

Guidance on the CIC Questionnaire on Enclosed Space Entry

5	Are the atmosphere testing devices regularly checked and calibrated?	 Ensure gas meters are in good working order, serviced, calibrated and tested in accordance with the manufacturer's instructions. Calibration kit to be available on board Personnel carrying out checks and bump tests are to be suitably trained. Calibration / Bump test certificate to be filed in share point Length of sampling hose to be sufficient to reach bottom of enclosed space from deck Maker manual to be available onboard 	
6	Is the emergency rescue equipment for enclosed space entry and rescue in good condition?	 Rescue equipment like tripod, stretcher, resuscitator, BA sets etc and a plan to get the crew out from the most difficult spot in space shall be in readiness The rescue equipment to be kept in readiness at the entrance shall be clearly specified in the permit. Ensure rescue equipment is in good condition Reference HSE 4.10 / SECTION 11 - RESCUE FROM ENCLOSED SPACES 	
7	Are the personnel familiar with the safe entry and risk assessment procedures for enclosed space?	 All crew members must be aware of the spaces identified as enclosed space on board, risks involved, entry procedure, entry permit, PPE and communication required during entering enclosed space All crew members shall be aware of the safety equipment for enclosed space entry and rescue, such as ventilation, lifting and other personnel rescue equipment, first aid and resuscitation equipment, gas testing equipment, breathing apparatus etc that may be required in an emergency Crew must be able to don the breathing apparatus and carry out checks correctly Breathing apparatus including all spare SCBA bottles shall be kept fully charged and all other rescue equipment kept in readiness and in good order All crew members shall be familiar with their duties as assigned in the enclosed space emergency muster list before the voyage begins. All crew members must be aware that in case they detect hazardous situation they can order and evacuation of the space. All crew members shall be familiarized with Contingency plan 35. Rescue from enclosed space 	
8	Are the personnel familiar with the operation of safety protective	Master to provide training in the use and operation of equipment to all officers and crew	

Guidance on the CIC Questionnaire on Enclosed Space Entry

equipment and devices?	 Competent, Responsible, and Attendant persons planning an enclosed space entry should be aware of the limitations of the testing equipment and should be able to demonstrate that they can use it competently Crew should be aware that oxygen, flammable or toxic gas or vapor concentrations may not be uniform throughout space, and it may not be possible to measure concentrations throughout the entire space prior to entry Master to provide training in calibration of equipment to all deck officers and engineers Training in the use of gas equipment should be provided during each enclosed space drill Reference to be made to Maker's manual for operation and calibration of equipment Records of training to be maintained on board 	
9 Is the enclosed space entry and rescue drill in accordance with SOLAS Chapter III, Regulation 19.3.3?	 The interval of the enclosed space entry and rescue drills should not exceed two months. Ensure enclosed space entry and enclosed space rescue drills are conducted in accordance with drill planner (Every 2 months) Drill record sheet and entry permit used for entering the enclosed space shall be available. Entry permit is evidence that pre-entry checks and authorization of entry Refer to form 3.2.1 "Emergency Drill planner" The drill shall be recorded in Deck Logbook, Drill Record Sheet 3.2.3 Be ready at any time for this request from PSCO A scenario for a planned enclosed space and subsequent rescue should be agreed with PSCO. The scenario should reflect a designated enclosed space on the ship, and the hazards associated with entry into that space. The inspector shall verify that crew are able to conduct enclosed space entry and rescue drills competently and in a safe manner The inspector shall verify that documented procedures are being followed, the prescribed safety briefings are given, and the required authorizations (permits) are completed, and signoffs are obtained. Those taking part should be identified on the appropriate checklists and authorizations 	

Guidance on the CIC Questionnaire on Enclosed Space Entry

		 Drill should not take longer than 20 minutes Follow the procedure as provided in contingency plan Crew shall be made aware of their duties and equipment locations. All equipment shall be kept in readiness Following shall be complied as per SOLAS : Checking and use of personal protective equipment required for entry Checking the use of communication equipment and procedures including emergency signals prior entry Checking and use of instruments for measuring the atmosphere in enclosed spaces Checking and use of rescue equipment and procedures Instructions in first aid and resuscitation techniques 	
10	Is the SMS related to enclosed space operations effectively implemented on board?	 HSE Procedure Manual, 4.10. ENCLOSED SPACE ENTRY Permit to work form 3.3.1 Risk assessment in CSM Form 3.2.1 Emergency Drill planner Contingency plan 35 - Rescue from enclosed space 	





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> SPRO [2025] 02 7 February 2025



Reporting Requirements for Foreign-flagged Ships Entering the Internal Waters of the People's Republic of China in Emergency Situations

Dear Sir/Madam,

The China Maritime Safety Administration (China MSA) has recently issued the "Announcement on the Reporting Requirements for Foreign-flagged Ships Entering the Internal Waters of the People's Republic of China in Emergency Situations" (hereinafter referred to as the "Announcement"). The Announcement aims to regulate the reporting procedures for foreign-flagged ships entering China's internal waters in emergency situations. We are issuing this Circular to help the Clubs and their Members better understand the Announcement.

Background and Main Contents of the Announcement

In order to effectively safeguard national sovereignty and comprehensively ensure the safety and order of waters, China has established a rigorous and comprehensive regulatory system for foreign-flagged ships entering its internal waters. Under normal circumstances, if a foreign-flagged ship plans to enter China's internal waters, she is obligated to submit an application to the Chinese MSA in advance and truthfully provide relevant materials as required. Only after obtaining approval and ensuring that the ship meets all safety and regulatory standards, can she enter China's internal waters within the specified time and along designated route.

However, ships are constantly exposed to various maritime risks. In the event of sudden emergencies or serious threats to navigation safety, the ship may need to seek temporary refuge or rescue by urgently entering a country's internal waters to ensure the safety of lives and the ship herself. To address such special circumstances, the China MSA has issued this Announcement, aiming to provide systematic, comprehensive, and practical reporting guidance for foreign-flagged ships entering China's internal waters in emergencies. This ensures that such special navigation activities are conducted in a safe and orderly manner pursuant to relevant applicable laws and regulations.

This Announcement applies to foreign-flagged ships which need to urgently enter the internal waters of China due to emergency situations, such as urgent illness, mechanical failure, distress, and adverse weather conditions, when a permit to enter port areas has not yet been obtained. The Announcement clearly stipulates the reporting methods, reporting requirements and legal responsibilities. For detailed information, please refer to the original Announcement attached to this Circular.

Our Suggestions

Foreign-flagged ships navigating or operating in China's internal waters that violate relevant Chinese laws, regulations or rules will inevitably face administrative penalties from the competent Authorities, such as warnings, fines, or even detention. In severe cases, criminal liability may also be pursued according to the law. In light of this, we suggest that foreign-flagged ships entering China's internal waters due to emergencies strictly adhere to the relevant requirements of the Announcement, actively comply with the instructions and supervision of China MSA, and ensure full compliance with all Chinese laws and regulations, such as pollution prevention regulations, safety management rules, navigation rules, and other applicable local regulations. This will create favorable conditions for the ships to receive refuge or rescue, ensuring the full protection of the legitimate rights and interests of all parties and the maintenance of safety and order of the water area involved.

Should you have any inquiries, please feel free to contact Huatai Beijing (pni.bj@huatai-serv.com) or our local branch offices.

Best regards,

CUI Jiyu Head of Marine Team

Attachment

Announcement by the Maritime Safety Administration of the People's Republic of China on Reporting Requirements for Foreign-flagged Ships Entering the Internal Waters of the People's Republic of China in Emergency Situations

According to the Maritime Traffic Safety Law of the People's Republic of China, foreign-flagged ships shall make an urgent report to the maritime administrations when entering the internal waters of the People's Republic of China in emergency situations. The relevant reporting requirements are hereby announced as follows:

PART 1 APPLICATION

The reporting requirements apply to foreign-flagged ships which need to urgently enter the internal waters of the People's Republic of China due to emergency situations, such as urgent illness, mechanical failure, distress, and adverse weather conditions, when a permit to enter port areas has not yet been obtained.

PART 2 REPORTING CHANNELS

The reporting shall be done through, inter alia, marine radiotelephony, DSC on VHF, MF and HF, marine satellite telephone, wired telephone, fax, the national hotline "12395" for maritime search and rescue when in distress, or other effective means.

PART 3 REPORTING REQUIREMENTS

1. In the case of an emergency, a foreign-flagged ship shall, while entering the internal waters of the People's Republic of China, make an urgent report to the local maritime administration with the following contents:

- (1) Name of ship, IMO number, call sign, flag, type of ship, and contact information;
- (2) Ship owner, operator and manager;
- (3) Ship position, course, speed and planned navigation routes;

(4) Estimated entry and departure time;

(5) Main dimensions and draft of the ship;

(6) Number of the crew and passengers onboard and their health conditions, and the number of persons in distress, illness or casualties;

(7) Cargo information, and the official names, UN numbers, pollution classes and quantities of the dangerous goods;

(8) Direct cause of the emergency entry, measures taken and assistance requested; and (9) The Emergency Report Form (see appendix), which shall be submitted as supplement as soon as the ship has entered the internal waters of the People's Republic of China.

2. If the Automatic Identification System (AIS) of a foreign-flagged ship does not work properly after emergency entry into the internal waters of the People's Republic of China, in addition to the above-mentioned reporting requirements, the following information shall be reported every hour until the ship leaves the internal waters of the People's Republic of China or obtains a permit to enter port areas:

(1) Name of ship, call sign and IMO number; and

(2) Current ship position, intended course and speed.

PART 4 MISCELLANEOUS ITEMS

1. The foreign-flagged ship entering the internal waters of the People's Republic of China in emergency situations shall be subject to instructions and supervision of the competent maritime administrations.

2. The competent maritime administration is entitled to take actions according to relevant laws, regulations and rules in the case that a foreign-flagged ship fails to report as required, or refuses to follow its instructions or supervision.

This announcement shall enter into force as of March 1st, 2025.

Emergency Report Form

]
	Name of ship			Flag			Type of sh	ip	
	Call sign			IMO No.			Positio	n	
Particulars	L.O.A			Breadth			Draft		
of ship	Course and speed			Port of departure			Port of arriv	val	
	Ship c	owner				Ship	operator		
	Ship 1	nanager							
	Hull colo color ar								
Details of	Entry time				De	partur	e time		
entering China's	Departure port and departure time				Last port of call and departure time				
internal water		s of crew ssengers							
	Name of cargo					Gener	al cargo (ton)		
Cargo	Cargo quan	tity (ton)			Details	Dang	gerous goods (ton)		
information	Official 1 UN numb dangerou	per of the			Class o	f the good	dangerous ls		
-	Meteorological and hydrological conditions								
Direct cau	Direct cause of the emergency								
entry, measures taken and									
assistance required Remarks									
Contact details (ship and agen		t):		Nam Date		ship: :/month/day	y):		



February 2025

05/2025: New Emissions Control Areas for Mediterranean Sea, Canadian Arctic and Norwegian Sea

Applicability: shipowners, ship operators, ship managers and ship masters.


The IMO has adopted amendments to MARPOL Annex VI which introduce three new Emissions Control Areas (ECAs) for nitrogen oxides (NOx) and sulphur oxides (SOx).

The following new areas will require ships to comply with reduced emissions limitations:

- Mediterranean Sea (SOx)
- Canadian Arctic (NOx and SOx)
- Norwegian Sea (NOx and SOx)

These ECAs are defined in the regulations and are illustrated in below charts:

Mediterranean Sea - In the below chart, the numbered points relate to the corresponding coordinates given in the regulations.



05/2025: New Emissions Control Areas for Mediterranean Sea, Canadian Arctic and Norwegian Sea

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Canadian Arctic - In the below chart, the numbered points relate to the corresponding coordinates given in the regulations.



Norwegian sea - In the below chart, the numbered points relate to the corresponding coordinates given in the regulations.



Mediterranean Sea becomes a SOx ECA from 1 May 2025

From this date, amendments to MARPOL Annex VI Regulation 14.3.5, as amended by IMO Resolution <u>MEPC.361(79)</u>, will prohibit ships operating within the Mediterranean Sea ECA from using fuel oils with a sulphur content exceeding 0.1% m/m unless an approved equivalent arrangement is used such as Exhaust Gas Cleaning Systems.

Canadian Arctic and Norwegian Sea become NOx ECAs from 1 March 2026

From this date, in accordance with MARPOL Annex VI Regulations 13, as amended by IMO Resolution <u>MEPC.392(82)</u>, ships operating in either the Canadian Arctic ECA or Norwegian Sea ECA with a marine diesel engine with power output of more than 130kW are required to be certified to the NOx Technical Code 2008 to meet the NOx Tier III standard, as follows:

• For the Canadian Arctic ECA, ships with keels laid or at a similar stage of construction on or after 1 January 2025.

05/2025: New Emissions Control Areas for Mediterranean Sea, Canadian Arctic and Norwegian Sea

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- For the Norwegian Sea ECA:
 - Ships with a building contract placed on or after 1 March 2026
 - In absence of a building contract, ships with keels laid or at a similar stage of construction on or after 1 September 2026; or
 - The delivery is on or after 1 March 2030

Canadian Arctic and Norwegian Sea become SOx ECAs from 1 March 2027

From this date, amendments to MARPOL Annex VI Regulations 14.3.6 and 14.3.7, as amended by IMO Resolution MEPC.392(82), will prohibit ships operating within either the Canadian Arctic ECA or Norwegian Sea ECA from using fuel oils with a sulphur content exceeding 0.1% m/m unless an approved equivalent arrangement is used such as Exhaust Gas Cleaning Systems.

LR advises that ship owners and ship operators are aware of three new Emissions Control Areas (ECAs) for nitrogen oxides (NOx) and sulphur oxides (SOx).

Ships operating in or entering the new SOx ECAs on or after their effective dates, will need to have on board sufficient compliant fuel oil (0.1% m/m maximum sulphur content) and bring it into use as required, or have installed and operate an approved alternative compliance mechanism, such as an Exhaust Gas Cleaning System.

Ships entering the new SOx ECAs before these dates, which intend to stay in them after the relevant ECA enters effect, will need to ensure that compliant fuel oil is brought into use no later than 00:00 hrs on the effective date. Lloyd's Register recommends that this fuel change-over is recorded in the same way as if the ship was entering an ECA.

Existing ECAs

The existing NOx and SOx ECAs are as follows:

- North American area
- United States Caribbean Sea area
- Baltic Sea area, and
- North Sea area

For further information

For further information or advice, please get in touch with statutorysupport@lr.org.

05/2025: New Emissions Control Areas for Mediterranean Sea, Canadian Arctic and Norwegian Sea





ON THE JOB TRAINING

VESSEL :

DATE :

Details of training: GMDSS Battery off-load/on-load voltage test

Test procedure

- 1. Turn off the AC power supply to the GMDSS equipment.
- 2. Ensure all other power sources charging the battery are also switched off.
- 3. Record the initial voltage of the battery once the GMDSS equipment starts receiving battery power. At this stage **battery is off-load** when equipment is not transmitting.
- 4. Press the Push-to-Talk (PTT) button to transmit on a non-distress and idle Radio Telephony (R/T) frequency. **Battery is on-load** when equipment is transmitting.
- 5. Record the voltage under load when the PTT button is pressed.
- 6. Ensure the **voltage drop does not exceed 1.5 volts**. A larger drop may indicate battery issues.

Purpose of above test

The daily off-load/on-load voltage check for a ship's GMDSS MF/HF is meant for ensuring the equipment's reliability and readiness in case of an emergency. Here are the main purposes:

- 1. Verify Battery Connections between the battery and the equipment are intact and functioning properly.
- 2. The voltage of the battery does not drop too quickly under load, indicating the battery's ability to supply consistent power.
- 3. To identify potential issues early.
- 4. Ensuring that the GMDSS equipment can be powered by the battery in case of emergency.

3/0

This procedure helps ensure that the battery can supply consistent power to the GMDSS equipment and is ready for use in an emergency.

Above has been read, practically test carried out and understood.

C/O

D/C

Verified by: Master

Please file in OneDrive/ 3.2.3 Training folder

2/0

ANNEX 3

RESOLUTION MEPC.361(79) (adopted on 16 December 2022)

AMENDMENTS TO THE ANNEX OF THE PROTOCOL OF 1997 TO AMEND THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION FOR THE PREVENTION OF POLLUTION FROM SHIPS, 1973, AS MODIFIED BY THE PROTOCOL OF 1978 RELATING THERETO

(Mediterranean Sea Emission Control Area for Sulphur Oxides and Particulate Matter)

THE MARINE ENVIRONMENT PROTECTION COMMITTEE,

RECALLING Article 38(a) of the Convention on the International Maritime Organization concerning the functions of the Marine Environment Protection Committee conferred upon it by international conventions for the prevention and control of marine pollution from ships,

RECALLING ALSO article 16 of the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973, as modified by the Protocols of 1978 and 1997 relating thereto (MARPOL), which specifies the amendment procedure and confers upon the appropriate body of the Organization the function of considering amendments thereto for adoption by the Parties,

HAVING CONSIDERED, at its seventy-ninth session, proposed amendments to MARPOL Annex VI, concerning the Mediterranean Sea Emission Control Area for Sulphur Oxides and Particulate Matter, which were circulated in accordance with article 16(2)(a) of MARPOL,

1 ADOPTS, in accordance with article 16(2)(d) of MARPOL, amendments to MARPOL Annex VI, the text of which is set out in the annex to the present resolution;

2 DETERMINES, in accordance with article 16(2)(f)(iii) of MARPOL, that the amendments shall be deemed to have been accepted on 1 November 2023 unless prior to that date not less than one third of the Parties or Parties the combined merchant fleets of which constitute not less than 50% of the gross tonnage of the world's merchant fleet have communicated to the Organization their objection to the amendments;

3 INVITES the Parties to note that, in accordance with article 16(2)(g)(ii) of MARPOL, the said amendments shall enter into force on 1 May 2024 upon their acceptance in accordance with paragraph 2 above;

4 ALSO INVITES the Parties to note that, in accordance with regulation 14.7 of MARPOL Annex VI, ships operating in the Mediterranean Sea Emission Control Area for Sulphur Oxides and Particulate Matter are exempt from the requirements in paragraphs 4 and 6 of regulation 14 of MARPOL Annex VI and from the requirements of paragraph 5 of that regulation insofar as they relate to paragraph 4 of that regulation until 1 May 2025;

5 INVITES coastal States of the Mediterranean Sea Emission Control Area for Sulphur Oxides and Particulate Matter to ratify and effectively implement MARPOL Annex VI, as soon as possible, if they have not yet done so, at least by the date of entry into force of the said amendments; 6 REQUESTS the Secretary-General, for the purposes of article 16(2)(e) of MARPOL, to transmit certified copies of the present resolution and the text of the amendments contained in the annex to all Parties to MARPOL;

7 ALSO REQUESTS the Secretary-General to transmit copies of the present resolution and its annex to Members of the Organization which are not Parties to MARPOL.

ANNEX

AMENDMENTS TO MARPOL ANNEX VI

(Mediterranean Sea Emission Control Area for Sulphur Oxides and Particulate Matter)

Regulation 14

Sulphur oxides (SO_x) and particulate matter

1 At the end of paragraph 3.3, the word "and" is deleted. At the end of paragraph 3.4, "." is replaced by "; and". A new paragraph 3.5 is added as follows:

".5 the Mediterranean Sea Emission Control Area, which means the area described by the coordinates provided in appendix VII to this annex."

Appendix VII

Emission control areas (regulations 13.6 and 14.3)

2 A new paragraph 4 is inserted, as follows:

"4 In respect of the application of regulation 14.4, the Mediterranean Sea Emission Control Area for Sulphur Oxides and Particulate Matter includes all waters bounded by the coasts of Europe, Africa and Asia, and is described by the following coordinates:

- .1 the western entrance to the Straits of Gibraltar, defined as a line joining the extremities of Cape Trafalgar, Spain (36°11'.00 N, 6°02'.00 W) and Cape Spartel, Morocco (35°48'.00 N, 5°55'.00 W);
- .2 the Strait of Canakkale, defined as a line joining Mehmetcik Burnu (40°03'N, 26°11'E) and Kumkale Burnu (40°01'.00 N, 26°12'.00 E); and
- .3 the northern entrance to the Suez Canal excluding the area enclosed by geodesic lines connecting points 1-4 with the following coordinates:

Point	Latitude	Longitude
1	31°29'.00 N	32°16'.00 E
2	31°29'.00 N	32°28'.48 E
3	31°14'.00 N	32°32'.62 E
4	31°14'.00 N	32°16'.00 E

NO	QUESTION	GUIDANCE	REFERENCE / GUIDANCE	Verified by Master / Comments
12.1	Is access to the ship being controlled by an adequate deck watch? (V)	Guide to Inspection	Visitor log to be updated (SSP FORM APPX 6)	
		Even if it is not applicable under local regulations for some vessels to comply with the ISPS Code, it must be borne in mind that it is good practice to have a member of the vessel's crew permanently stationed at the gangway for safety purposes. They will be able to assist persons transiting the gangway as required and to monitor any dangerous practices. The watchman must keep in mind that he is the first point of contact on the vessel for the person boarding. If a vessel is alongside a berth affected by tidal conditions, constant reassessment of the situation should be carried out. In addition, the watchman must have access to the times of high and low waters and be aware of any cargo operations which may affect the vessel's trim. If a watchman is not present at the gangway and an incident occurs, the vessel's crew may carry on with their duties unaware of the situation. (Gangways, 2014)	Positive checking of the identity, issue visitor's card Visitors card back side contains action to be taken in event of	
		The deck watch has a responsibility to make all visitors aware of any specific hazards of the cargo or operations onboard the vessel and point out instructions to visitors what to do in the event of an emergency.	emergency and other information Body / baggage search (SSP APPX 6)	
			Gangway to be manned 24 hrs in port (HSE 4.17)	
			High and low tide timings to be kept at gangway (HSE 4.17)	
			Gangway / moorings to be adjusted based on draft / trim / tide (HSE 4.17)	
			Hazard of cargo to be kept at gangway (IMSBC CODE PAGE / MSDS ETC) (HSE 4.17 – safe	
			access) Conduct OJT 031 – Security Duties in Port and Anchorage	

	1	Section 12: Security
12.2	Has a Ship Security Officer (SSO) been	Guide to Inspection
	(SSO) been appointed and trained adequately to perform the duties of SSO and have all crew received security-related training and instructions? (V)	 The duties and responsibilities of the SSO shall include, but are not limited to: Undertaking regular security inspections of the ship to ensure that appropriate security measures are maintained Maintaining and supervising the implementation of the SSP, including any amendments to the plan Coordinating the security aspects of the handling of cargo and ship's stores with other shipboard personnel and with the relevant PFSOs Proposing modifications to the SSP Reporting to the company's security officer (CSO) any deficiencies and non-conformities identified during internal audits, periodic reviews, security inspections and verifications of compliance and implementing any corrective actions Enhancing security awareness and vigilance on board Ensuring that adequate training has been provided to shipboard personnel, as appropriate Reporting all security incidents Coordinating implementation of the SSP with the CSO and the relevant Port Facility Security Officer (PFSO) Ensuring that security equipment is properly operated, tested, and calibrated, and ensuring the occurrence of ship security drills and exercises. Ensuring the proper maintenance of all records pertaining to the ship's security Notifying the CSO of ship security incidents and any breaches of this regulation. In the absence of a CSO, notify law enforcement agencies and other law enforcement respondents of ship security incidents and any breaches of this regulation, and Ensuring that all security measures set forth in this regulation are implemented and enforced. (ISPS Code, 2003) In accordance to the revised STCW 2010 Code as of 1st January 2014 all seafarers must receive approved security awareness
		training. (STCW code Reg A-VI/6-1)
12.3	Are deck officers familiar with the	
	function and use of the Ship Security Alert System and is the Ship Security Alert System being tested regularly? (V)	Guide to Inspection
		The inspector shall not ask for the details and location of the ship's Security Alert System.
		All ships constructed after 1st July 2004 shall be fitted with a ship security alert system.
		The ship security alert system shall, when activated, initiate, and transmit a ship-to-shore security alert to a competent authority, which in these circumstances may include the Company, identifying the ship, its location and indicating that the security of the ship is under threat or it has been compromised.
		It shall not send the security alert to other ships or raise the alarm on board, and it shall continue until deactivated or reset. The ship security alert system shall be capable of being activated from the navigation bridge, and in at least one other location. (SOLAS 74, 2014)

(CNO designated as SSO – HSE 5.1/SHIP SECURITY)	
CNO should hold approved SSO training certificate.	
All seafarers shall have security awareness training certificate	
SSO should be familiar with his duties as provided in SSP.	
Ensure all ship security related records are filed in the Shared folder.	
Conduct training and drills as per SSP APPX 5 and file records of training in G drive	
Deck officers should be aware of the 2 SSAS locations.	
Ensure SSAS test records are filed in Onedrive / G drive	
Deck Officers should be aware that SSAS is tested with office and flag state MPA on annual basis.	
Annual SSAS test with MI	

12.4	If the vessel transits or may transit a Piracy	Guide to Inspection
	High Risk Area (HRA), are security charts and publications being provided? (V)	 ADMIRALTY Maritime Security Charts contain safety-critical information to assist bridge crews in the planning of safe passages through high-risk areas. All information has been gathered by the UKHO through work with NATO and other government organisations, ensuring each chart has the most accurate, up-to-date, and verified information available. Each Maritime Security Chart includes: Information about dangers to the security of navigation including piracy, terrorism, embargoes, mine warfare, exclusion zones, blockades, and illegal fishing. This information, when used alongside official navigational charts, can help to ensure the safety of ships, crew, and cargo. General security advice, self-protective measures, security procedures and regional contacts, as well as routeing and reporting requirements implemented by military or security forces. Weekly updates and new editions to help maintain high levels of accuracy and safety. Guides also include ADMIRALTY Quick Response (QR) codes for quick access to a list of all Notices to Mariners (NMs) that affect the specific chart or publication. Maritime Security Charts should be kept up to date with the latest security-critical navigational information. The Security Related Information to Mariners (SRIM) service provides all the data needed to maintain your charts from official government sources.
		(Admiralty.co.uk, 2018

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	flag is not required.	
	SSAS shall also be tested prior to entering HRA.	
	Somalia / West coast BMP and other anti-piracy publications are available in Regs4ships (Antipiracy section)	
	Following latest edition of security charts to be available on board as per library list:	
	Q6099 Q6110 Q6111 Q6112 Q6113 Q6114	
	The active SRIM shall be downloaded from the website below and attached to the security charts	
	https://www.admir alty.co.uk/maritim e-safety- information/securi ty-related- information-to- mariners	
	Also the reporting requirements from above link to be complied with for each area.	

		Section 12: Security
12.5	If the vessel transited or may transit an area	Guide to Inspection
	with a high risk of piracy, has a voyage risk assessment been produced? (V)	 The company's security officer (CSO) and the vessel's Master have the combined responsibility to produce a voyage risk assessment. The procedure for this should be outlined in the vessels SMS. The risk assessment should include: Highlighting areas of increased threat to the vessel. Identify the high-risk areas for that region Identifying methods often used by pirates in these areas, and vulnerable areas where pirates could board The ships own characteristics including handling, freeboard, speed, and general arrangement Military or official organisation cooperation and reporting requirements Existing guidelines and information sources Ship and company procedures, communication, and chain of command.
		The vessel's manager should implement appropriate measures to meet the threat of piracy by adopting IMO and other industry- recommended practices suitable for the circumstances of the voyage and ship type.
		(Maritime Security – General Recommendations, 2017)
12.6	Have preventive	
	measures been taken by the master and crew during the stay in port and prior to	Guide to Inspection
	departure to prevent stowaways? (V)	The issue of stowaways is one which has existed ever since vessels began to trade. Procedures for the prevention of stowaways should be incorporated in the Safety Management System and should be effectively implemented by the Master and the crew on board the ship.
12.7	Are cyber security policies and procedures being incorporated in the safety management system	

RA to be prepared for the following in CSM	
 Carriage of armed guards Navigating in HRA like GOA Navigating in south east asia 	
Company form SSP 10.2.2 to be completed and filed	
HSE Procedure Manual/5.1 Ship Security/ section, 7.3 Risk Assessment	
HSE 5.1- SECTION 12	
Prior departure port, stowaway search to be carried out and entered in deck logbook.	
Contingency plan – section 47 - STOWAWAY	
STOWAWAY search checklist – NAV B9	
SSP - STOWAWAY	
Refer HSE Procedure Manual/ 5.3 - Cyber Security Responsibility – refer section 1.1, Master is	

Section 12: Security

	Section 12. Security		
and has the cyber	Guide to Inspection		
security	Record Finding if cyber security management has not been incorporated into the vessel's SMS by the company's first annual		
management	verification of the DOC after January 1, 2021.		
system been	The schere s		
evaluated and verified?	 The cyber security management shall: Identify the roles and responsibilities of users, key personnel, and management both ashore and on board Identify the systems, assets, data and capabilities, which if disrupted, could pose risks to the ship's operations and safety Implement technical measures to protect against a cyber-incident and ensure continuity of operations. This may include configuration of networks, access control to networks and systems, communication and boundary defence and the use of 		
	 Implement activities and plans (procedural protection measures) to provide resilience against cyber incidents. This may include training and awareness, software maintenance, remote and local access, access privileges, use of removable media and equipment disposal Implement activities to prepare for and respond to cyber incidents. 		
	(The Guidelines on Cyber Security On board Ships, 2017)		
	The IMO have urged the maritime industry to refer to the requirements of Member Governments and Flag Administrations, as well as applicable international and industry standards and best practices, for detailed guidelines on cyber risk management. Additional guidance and standards may include, but are not limited to:		
	 The Guidelines on Cyber Security Onboard Ships produced and supported by ICS, IUMI, BIMCO, OCIMF, INTERTANKO, INTERCARGO, InterManager, WSC and SYBAss. Consolidated IACS Recommendation on cyber resilience (Rec 166). ISO/IEC 27001 standard on Information technology – Security techniques –Information security management systems – 		
	 Sci ISO/IEC 27001 Standard of Initiation technology – Security techniques – Information Security management systems – Requirements. Published jointly by the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) and the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC). United States National Institute of Standards and Technology's Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity (the NIST Framework). 		
	Reference should be made to the most current version of any guidance or standards utilized. (The additional guidance and standards are listed as a non-exhaustive reference to further detailed information for users of these Guidelines. The referenced guidance and standards have not been issued by the Organization and their use remains at the discretion of individual users of these Guidelines.)		
	(IMO Guidelines on Maritime Cyber Risk Management 2021)		
	As computer technology advances, the nature of digital attacks will continue to evolve. To secure the safety of the digital infrastructure, shipping companies are strongly encouraged to go above and beyond regulatory compliance and implement a more proactive cyber-risk management approach.		
	RightShip urges vessel managers to create a robust cyber security management system to avoid and reduce cyber threats to their ships by engaging cyber security expert firms. The system should undergo an operational, technical, and physical evaluation in accordance with industry standards, and be certified by an expert cyber security firm. Example of cyber security expert firms include classification societies and other firms specializing in this domain.		
	The term 'Cyber Security Expert Firm' refers to a professional entity that leverages skills, technological expertise, and training to secure an enterprise's sensitive data from both internal and external threats.		
12.8			
Are measures in	Guide to Inspection		
place for controlling the use of removable media such as	Removable media is a collective term for all methods of storing and transferring data between computers. This includes laptops, USB memory sticks, CDs, DVDs, and diskettes.		
USB memory sticks, CDs, DVDs, and	Transferring data from uncontrolled systems to controlled systems represents a major risk of introducing malware. Removable media can be used to bypass layers of defences and can be used to attack systems that are otherwise not connected to the internet.		
diskettes on shipboard computers? (V)	A clear policy for the use of such media devices is essential; it must ensure that media devices are not normally used to transfer information between un-controlled and controlled systems.		
	To avoid unauthorised access, removable media blockers should be used on all physically accessible computers and network ports. (The Guidelines on Cyber Security on board Ships, 2017)		
	Critical equipment such as ECDIS should be protected from malware and virus attack. Access to USB and RJ-45 ports shall be controlled – i.e., disable or lock the ports.		

responsible.	
Office PIC – Brett . Refer Communicatio n chart Designated Company Cyber Security Officer.	
Refer contingency plan no. 42 & 43 for response to the cyber incidents.	
Detailed on the job training OJT 68 and risk assessment for cyber security has promulgated to all vessels	
MEMO/ CYBER SECURITY CAMPAIGNS	
Refer HSE Procedure Manual/ 5.3 - Cyber Security Refer section 3.3 Protection and Detection Measures	
Inactivation of all USB port except Master's Laptop and Bridge PC.	
Dedicated USB for use in ECDIS/Bridge PC.	
Visitor's USB is not allowed in the ship board computers.	
Monthly training	

Ensure RISK ASSESSMENT for ECDIS has been completed and filed in NP 133C.	
USB for use in bridge PC & ECDIS is under 2NO custody.	
Conduct OJT 068 – Cyber Security to crew	



Voyage Planning and Execution within Planned Navigation Corridors

Purpose

To ensure that navigation corridors are used appropriately when planning on ECDIS, and to ensure that a voyage plan approved by the ship's Master is executed within the planned navigation corridor so far as is reasonably practicable.

Guidance for


- Ship operators
- Masters
- Officers Of the Watch (OOW's)
- Recognised organisations
- Flag states

Voyage Planning with XTD/XTL (cross track distances or limits)

"Voyage and passage planning includes appraisal, i.e. gathering all information relevant to the contemplated voyage or passage; detailed planning of the whole voyage or passage from berth to berth, including those areas necessitating the presence of a pilot; execution of the plan; and the monitoring of the progress of the vessel in the implementation of the plan". **IMO Guidelines for Voyage Planning (Res A.893(21)).**

Having made a full appraisal of the intended voyage, a detailed passage plan is to be plotted on an ECDIS whilst also factoring in the intended XTD/XTL from berth to berth for each leg. This determines the planned navigational corridor for each leg of the passage that is electronically checked for charted hazards using the route check function. Any specific dangers that are identified can then be considered and amended as necessary prior to the Master's final approval of the overall passage plan and start of the voyage.

When a bridge team is monitoring and executing the voyage, remaining within the planned navigation corridor is intended to minimise workload as it readily indicates pre-checked waters where the ship can safely navigate.



Navigating within the planned navigation corridor

The safety contour setting, which should be set at the safety depth, is used to define a generally "No-Go" area i.e. where the ship may be in imminent danger and should avoid where possible. Note that this setting uses the closest available chart contour that is at least as deep as the setting entered, for example if the chart has contours at 10m and 15m and the safety contour setting is 11m, then the safety contour on the chart will be the 15m contour. Depth soundings that are equal to or shallower than the safety depth will be black and must always be avoided (soundings deeper than the safety depth are grey).

Guidance for departing from the Planned Navigation Corridor into the Safety Margin.

The voyage is expected to be executed in accordance with the voyage plan, and monitored to remain within the planned navigation corridor so far as is reasonably practicable. Any departure from the approved voyage plan is to be carefully considered.

An adequate balance between the width of the planned navigational corridor and the safety margin is to be determined for each leg of the voyage plan by taking into account:

- GNSS accuracy.
- Vessel's characteristics.
- ENC's Zone of Confidence (ZoC).
- Expected traffic conditions.


Areas outside of the planned navigation corridor up to No-Go areas are considered a safety margin available for unplanned/unforeseen circumstances. Departing from the approved navigation corridor into the safety margin requires additional caution to maintain situational awareness since this area has not been electronically verified, pre checked or approved by the Master.

When it is necessary to immediately use the safety margin outside the planned navigation corridor, a visual check and assessment of the ECDIS should be made by the bridge team and a plan discussed/agreed by all to execute a deviation and return as soon as possible given the circumstances. The use of ECDIS look ahead functionalities in such cases becomes paramount.


Should a non-urgent deviation from the voyage plan be identified, the Master is to be consulted and the voyage plan amended prior to leaving the planned navigation corridor.

Recording reasons for departing from the approved voyage plan will aid verification of sound navigation practices.

AMSA recognises the need for reasonable use of the safety margins outside the planned navigation corridor. However, unreasonable, and systematic use of the safety margins may indicate the need to reassess the voyage planning practices.



Close quarters situation developing within the planned navigation corridor



Ship manoeuvres outside the planned navigation corridor to avoid risk of collision

Port State Control (PSC) inspections

Voyage planning requirements giving effect to SOLAS requirements are established in Australian legislation in Marine Order 27.

A deficiency may be considered where an Australian PSC Officer finds:

- unreasonable and systemic use of the safety margins outside of the planned navigation corridor.
- no consideration given in voyage planning to the variation in XTD/XTL depending on confined or open waters.

IMO references

A.893(21) – Guidelines for Voyage Planning

MSC.232(82) – Revised Performance Standards for Electronic Chart Display and Information Systems (ECDIS) MSC.530(106) – Performance standards for Electronic Chart Display and Information Systems (ECDIS) MSC.1/Circ.1503/Rev.2 ECDIS – Guidance for Good Practice

CHIEF COOK RIGHT INDEX FINGER INJURED

Report exported on: 18.02.2025

Main Information

Category Accident Related to Work

Vessel location Coastal

Latitude 20° 13.800' N **Report Number** 2025-04 **Date** 2/16/2025 10:00 AM

Type Accident (Crew/Persons) Location on board

Galley

Longitude 72° 28.600' E

Event Details

The chief cook was using the meat grinder for grinding carrots and meat.

After he completed grinding, he observed that some pieces of carrots and meat were sticking inside the grinder and he tried pushing it inside using the feeding/pushing tool but could not remove the sticking meat.

He then used his index finger to push the meat down and during this process, the tip of his index finger got detached. (The grinder was kept ON and running when he inserted the finger)

The Company doctor was informed and first aid was provided onboard.

The Chief cook disembarked vessel at 1630 local time for medical treatment.

Master Comment

The chief cook was sent to hospital for medical treatment on arrival MAGDALLA on 16 feb 2025/ 1630h and returned onboard on 17 feb 2025/ 2045h.

He is scheduled for repatriation at next port as he cannot be repatriated in the present port MAGDALLA due to local regulations.

Immediate Cause

Lack of situational awareness and not complying with safety procedures as per maker instructions

Root Causes

Group	Root Cause	Remark
IC - Substandard Acts	02 Failure to Follow Procedure/instructions	The equipment manual clearly specifies that finger shall not be inserted in the meat grinder. These safety instructions were not read and complied with by the chief cook
RC PF-05 Lack of Competence	5.06 Lack of situational awareness / risk perception / risk awareness	Lack of situational awareness - The Chief cook made an improper judgement and inserted his finger to remove the sticking meat with the meat grinder power switched ON and operational.

Corrective Actions

The Company doctor was informed, and first aid was provided.

The Chief cook disembarked vessel at 1630 local time on 16 Feb for medical treatment. The Chief cook was briefed to apply common sense and maintain situational awareness when executing his duties.



CHIEF COOK RIGHT INDEX FINGER INJURED - IVS OKUDOGO

Preventive Actions

Laminated copy of the safety precautions was attached near the meat grinder and discussed with the galley crew.

The Company expects and requires that each crew devote their full attention towards personal safety.

The basic principles of common sense, situational awareness, prudence, rational judgment, good practices of seamanship, prevailing circumstances and conditions are to remain the basis when performing any task onboard.

Crew to be alert/ vigilant maintain situational awareness and not be in haste while doing any job.

Each crew shall pay close attention to their work and not attempt to short cut safety procedures. A momentary loss or lack of concentration often leads to an accident.

This incident will be shared with the fleet during the monthly campaign and discussed during crew seminars to prevent recurrence.

